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I. - STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

Robert Ervin Peterson appeals from the district court's Order Dismissin'.;) Petiton
for Post Conviction Relief filed June 17, 2013 (R., pp. 229 - 235) and the Order Denying
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed August 16, 2013 (R., pp. 261). Mr. Peterson
further appeals the District Court's Order denying his Motion for Reconsider, said Order
filed August 15, 2013 (R., pp. 231-233 Mr. Peterson asserts that the district court erred
by summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and by failing to alter or
amend its dismissal.

B. Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated

in Mr. Peterson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Peterson's
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief without findings of fact and
conclusions of law after evidentiary hearing?

Ill. ARGUMENT

A.
A.

The District Court Erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Peterson's Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief without entering findings of fact and conclusions of
law after evidentiary hearing.

As stated in Mr. Peterson's opening brief. summary dismissal of an application is
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permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material
fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517,518,960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998); Cowgerv.
State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999); Gonzales v. State, 120

Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991).

Thus, the court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on
the pleading, deposition, and admissions together with any affidavits on file. Rhoades v.
State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894,

896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993).
However, when an evidentiary hearing has been held, findings of fact and
conclusions of law are required. IRCP 52(a).
Also as stated in Mr. Peterson's opening brief, when the court sits as a trier of fact,
it is charged with the duty of preparing findings of fact and conclusions of law in support
of the decision it reaches. Pope v. lntermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 225, 646
P.2d 988 (1982). It must be re-stated that the purpose of requiring the court to find the
facts specially and state conclusions separately upon those facts is to provide the
appellate court a clear understanding of the court's decision, so that it can be
determined whether the trial court applied the proper law to appropriate facts. Id.
Because this matter was tried via evidentiary hearing, and because therefore the
district court sat as the trier of fact, the district court erred when it instead summarily
dismissed Mr. Peterson's claims in his petition without addressing the facts presented in
2

any fashion.
As noted above, In this case, the district court failed to make any findings of fact,
despite having held a hearing and taken evidence. Further, the district court did not
analyze the evidence presented but simply summarily dismissed the petition.

As a

consequence, the district court's error prevents the proper review of this case on
appeal.
Further the respondent did not address the contentions that the appellate court
may disregard the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law only where the
record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete understanding of the
material issues, and gives an obvious answer to a relevant question. Pope, 103 Idaho
at 225, 646 P.2d at __ .

Here, there was testimony from both petitioner, and

contradictory testimony from the petitioner's trial attorney, on all the issues raised in the
petition.

No clear answers appear without weighing the credibility of the witnesses.

When a case has been tried to a court, it is the province of the trial court, sitting as the
finder of fact, to weigh the conflicting evidence and testimony and judge the credibility of
the witnesses.

Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 114, 982

P.2d 945 (Ct. App. 1999).
Therefore, the summary dismissal was in error and must be reversed.

B.

The State's Motion for Summary Disposition was untimely and could not be
relied upon as a basis for summary disposition.

On May 20, 2013, the State filed its motion for summary dismissal, despite the
fact that an evidentiary hearing had occurred on March 20, 2013 and evidence had

3

been taken via testimony, exhibit and judicial notice. (R., pp. 179-180).

As stated in Mr. Peterson's prior briefing, a petition for post-conviction relief
under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is a civil action in nature.

Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007). Idaho Code§ 194907 states in pertinent part that "[a]II rules and stuates applicable in civil proceedings
including pre-trial, discovery and appellate procedures are available to the parties."
IRCP 56(b) stated at the time that a motion for summary judgment must be filed at least
60 days prior to trial.
As noted previously, the State's motion for summary disposition was not filed
until approximately 60 days after trial to the finder of fact, the district court. Therefore,
the motion was untimely and did not provide a basis upon which to enter summary
disposition. The State contends that the district court may order different timelines if it
chooses to.

However, the court did not enter such and order.

It simply ruled and

entered summary disposition despite the existence of testimony and evidence that
required findings and conclusions.

C. The District Court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Peterson's petition after
hearing.
Respondent incorrectly states that Mr. Peterson does not contest the district
court's summary dismissal of his petition. (See Respondent's brief psge 5).

Mr.

Peterson specifically noted the standards for entering a summary dismissal, and review
of said dismissal, on pages three and four of his opening brief.

He also notes that

testimony and other evidence was presented in support of his contentions on pages one
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and two of his opening brief.

counsel claim in a post-conviction action,

prevail on an ineffective

one must show that his or her attorney's performance was deficient, and that he or she
was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);
Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish

deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,
760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 162, 139 P.3d 762,
764 (Ct. App. 2006). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial
would have been different. Id.

In the evidentiary hearing, and in his verified petition and affidavit in facts in
support of petition, Mr. Peterson presented facts concerning how he was not advised
that he could have press and others removed from the court room. Petitioner testified
that he was not notified of said right, even after making specific inquiry about publicity
and what efforts could be made to shield him from such inquiry. (Tr. p. 22, L.21 - p. 33,
L.21.)
Mr. Peterson testified that at the hearing a multitude of law enforcement officers,
as well as many media outlets, complete with video cameras, and the like, were present
at the preliminary hearing as the case received heavy media attention. (Tr. p. 22, L.21 p. 33, L.21.) These factors caused Mr. Peterson to waive his preliminary hearing when
he would not of otherwise. Mr. Peterson contends that his counsel's performance was
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ineffective under the relevant law cited above, and that he was thereby prejudiced.
Based on the facts presented in evidence, the district court should not have summarily
dismissed.

Likewise, Mr. Peterson submitted evidence regarding not being informed of his
rights under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149. P.3d 833 (2006). Mr. Peterson
testified that his attorney never advised him of his rights under that statute, and that
nonetheless, the psychosexual evaluation performed was considered. (Tr. p. 43, L.12 p. 47, L.17.) Also, the exhibits entered into evidence demonstrated that Judge
McDermott was convinced that the defendant's rights had been violated and that he was
entitled to a new sentencing. (See, Tr. p. 45, L.23 - p. 46, L.23.). Therefore, Mr.
Peterson provided ample evidence of his counsel's failures in that regard. Summary
disposition was inappropriate.

Similarly, Mr. Peterson contends that his counsel's performance was so deficient
that his plea was not entered voluntarily. He supported said contention with evidence at
hearing. (Tr. p. 40, L.7 - p. 41, L.7; p. 53, L.1 - p. 54, L.19.)

First, Mr. Peterson testified he was not properly advised of his choices in regards
to the crime with which he was charged. Mr. Peterson argues, and testified at hearing,
that had he been advised of the elements of the offense which the State should have
been required to prove, he would not have entered a guilty plea.

Second, the plea was not voluntarily entered because even had petitioner been
correctly advised of his choices, his trial counsel threatened him with adverse action if
he refused to plead guilty. Counsel indicated to him, in anger, that counsel would not
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only withdraw from his representation if he did not enter a guilty plea, but also that he
would "blackball" the defendant, in a matter of speaking, by putting the word out that he
was a difficult client and that no other lawyers would want to afford him a zealous
defense. He therefore provided testimony that indicated that his guilty plea was not
given knowingly and voluntarily.

A guilty plea must be the voluntary expression of the defendant's own
choice. "[T]he agents of the state may not produce a plea by actual or
threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the
defendant." The plea is void if it is "induced by promises or threats which
deprive it of the nature of a voluntary act." (citations omitted).

laea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861 (9th Cir., 1986).
Thus, Mr. Peterson put forth evidence supporting his claims in his petition for
post conviction belief not only via verification of this petition and via a supporting
affidavit, but also via testimony. Therefore it is Mr. Peterson's contention that the district
court improperly summarily dismissed his petition based on incorrect procedure as
briefed above, and also because the court had before it controverted facts in evidence
that required findings of fact and conclusions of law, rather than summary disposition.

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, Mr. Peterson respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the district court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, and denying his
motion to reconsider, and remand the matter for further hearings.
0

V
DATED this_,"_ day of September, 2013.
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S EPHEN D. THOMPSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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